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Informal Sector and Corruption: 
An Empirical Investigation for India 
 
India is a country characterized by a huge informal sector. At the same time, it is a country 
where the extent of corruption in every sector is remarkably high. Stifling bureaucratic 
interference and corruption at every stage of economic activities is one of the main reasons 
behind high participation in informal and unregulated sectors. For economies characterized 
by high inequality and poverty, a useful tool for the government to pacify social unrest, is to 
choose a lower level of governance allowing substantial corruption in the system. Based on a 
study of 20 Indian states, we empirically show that higher corruption increases level of 
employment in the informal sector. Further, our analysis also shows that for higher levels of 
lagged state domestic product, the positive impact of corruption on the size of the informal 
sector is nullified. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  C12, C31, D23, J21 
  






Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta 
R-1, B. P. Township 
Kolkata 700 094 
India 
E-mail: saibal@cssscal.org   
 1.   Introduction  
  Informal sector plays a major role in employment generation, especially for the 
developing world (Agenor and Montiel, 1996; Harris-White and Sinha, 2007, Marjit and Kar, 
2011, etc.). It is especially interesting and challenging to study the causes of growth in the 
informal sector and its impacts on the economy as a whole.  The complexity of involving 
informal sector in such analyses arises typically because much of these activities are unrecorded 
and exists in the thin space between legality and illegality (De Soto, 2000; Dixit, 2004).   
Needless to say, any empirical investigation on informal sector is seriously constrained both by 
the availability of data and due to non-uniformity in the general description of what constitutes 
an informal sector.
1  
Among contested explanations behind growth of the informal sector in a country, a part 
of the literature finds that high level of corruption is an influential factor.  Substantial corruption 
among law enforcement authorities, financial agencies, bureaucrats, politicians, and other 
regulators would essentially mean more bribery and greater rent seeking in the formal sector.
2  
Consequently, the cost of creating new businesses and staying in business in the formal sector 
may become quite costly.  Thus, informal businesses may provide viable alternatives.  Moreover, 
this is facilitated by passive compliance from governments incapable of creating jobs 
commensurate with growth in the labor force.  Participation and existence in informal sector 
                                                      
1 Recently, two studies by the ILO and Delhi Group (2007) and the NCEUS Report (2007) have gone a long way in 
identifying the range and depth of informal activities in the world.  The NCEUS report in particular, defines zones 
within which informal activities may henceforth be categorized. In some other transition countries, such as Ukraine, 
a rich panel data set is available for measuring informal employment.  Informal employment is largely a result of 
insufficient job opportunities in the formal sector, while informal self-employment is often voluntary (Lehmann and 
Pignatti, 2007).      
2 See Saha (2001) for the relationship between red tapes and bribery in the context of a developing country.    
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 replaces much of the formal transaction costs by bribes.  This motivates us to explore the 
connections between corruption and the existence and persistence of informal sector in a 
developing country.    
  Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) provide a new perspective to this literature.  They 
analyze causes behind emergence of an informal sector in a political economy framework.  For 
economies characterized by high unemployment, high inequality and poverty, the government 
may choose a lower level of ‘good’ governance.  This can be a conscious choice to maximize 
income for a large informal sector and avoid social conflicts and political disturbances.  The 
extra legal occupations work as substitutes for social security and emerge as an innovative and 
effective re-distributive strategy. There should be little doubt that establishing this connection 
empirically can be a vexing exercise.  However, the National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO) in India publishes a large data set over a substantially long period which we use for 
exploring the relationship.     
  We use data for 20 major states in India and combining it with data from the corruption 
database (Transparency International) find support for the hypothesis that a higher level of 
corruption leads to a larger informal sector.  Further, our analysis shows that if the state had 
higher levels of income in the past, then the current impact of corruption on size of the informal 
sector is dampened.  
  Let us briefly elaborate on the connection between corruption and emergence of the 
informal sector.  The informal sector often emerges as an alternative to costlier formal sector 
production, as a means to avoid taxes, environmental strictures and labor laws (de Paula and 
Scheinkman, 2010; De Soto, 2000; Dixit, 2004, etc.).  Apparently, these are among the necessary 
conditions for existence.  However, insufficient monitoring – due to both lack of resources and 
3 
 strategic choice by the state aided by corrupt practices, leads to stability.  This may be a 
dominant factor why poorer countries encounter high incidence of informality vis-à-vis 
developed counterparts.   With respect to developing countries, Dasgupta and Marjit (2006) 
shows that given both unionised labour and informal workers, the state will have reasons to 
undermine the strength of trade unions and stealthily promote the culture of informal sector to 
push forward liberal policies.  However, Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) shows that tariff 
reduction and capital market reform in terms of lower interest rate may have conflicting effects 
on the size of the informal sector and hence, corruption in the economy.
3   
Finally, corruption is widely seen as an obstacle to the process of development. It distorts 
prices and raises transaction costs leading to inefficiency in the system. The persistence of petty 
and large-scale corruption are mostly reflections of robust (or, lack of) rule of law, transparency, 
accountability and regulations.  Corruption, in economic literature, is interestingly looked at 
from two very different perspectives. It is either seen as a phenomenon that “greases the wheel” 
or “sands the wheel” of economic development, driven by varying cross-country cultural 
practices.   Earlier, Leff (1964) argued that corruption could be a treated as a “second best” 
where bribes overcome indifference or hostility of a fickle government towards innovation (also 
see, Murphy et al. 1993). However, there is little evidence that even with cultural difference 
between notions of gifts versus bribes (Wei, 1999), corruption has less negative consequence for 
                                                      
3 Regarding corruption and wage inequality in the presence of informal sector, see Mandal and Marjit (2010). 
Prevalence of large informal sector has previously been explained via non-adherence to labor laws.  For example, 
Industrial Disputes Act (1947) in India defines activities in pro-worker states vis-à-vis pro-labor states (Besley and 
Burgess, 2004).  The Act was designed to offer workers in the organized sector some protection against exploitation 
by employers. The Act comprising of seven chapters and forty sections, specifies powers of governments – state and 
central, labor being a ‘concurrent’ subject, courts and tribunals, unions and workers and the exact procedures that 
have to be followed in resolving industrial disputes.  States independently amended the central law and made it look 
pro-worker, pro-labor or neutral.  In the pro-labor states upholding greater rights of labor one expects less organized 
firms and hence emergence of larger informal sectors.  For example, the total man days lost in West Bengal is more 
than 60% of what has been lost country-wise between 2000 and 2008; see Appendix 4.      
4 
 an economy.  Kaufmann and Wei (1999) argue that “greasing the wheel” view is true only in a 
very narrow sense when the bad regulation and official harassment are taken as exogenous. 
  Recent papers document role of corruption as deterrent to formal activities.  For example, 
Friedman et al. (2000) shows with cross-country evidence that entrepreneurs go underground not 
to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption.  Similarly, Mauro 
(1995) finds significant negative impact of corruption on total investment to GDP ratio of a 
country. Wei (1997) finds clear evidence that corruption in host country is a significant deterrent 
of FDI inflow into the same. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) finds that corruption increases the size of 
public investment at the expense of private investment, skews the composition of public 
expenditure away from development priorities towards expenditure on new equipments (also,  
Klitgaard, 1990).  These imply diversion of expenditure away from infrastructure, health and 
education and encourage rent seeking behavior of public officials.  Interestingly, Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) show that high and rising corruption (ICRG index) increases 
income inequality and poverty.
4     
India continues to be one of the most corrupt nations in the world with a Corruption 
Perception score (compiled by Transparency International) of 3.3 (out of 10, with 10 meaning 
the least corrupt case) in 2010. India’s nature of corruption, mostly seen as political, is a clear 
reflection of poor governance condition of the country. Correspondingly, it is also a country that 
has its majority of the workforce in the informal sector. According to the 2001 Census, 91% of 
the main workers in the total workforce are in the unorganized sector (Economic Survey, 2005-
                                                      
4 Also see, Johnson, Kauffman and Schleifer, 1997, for cross country evidence and Lavallée et al. (2008) for sub-
Saharan Africa.  Interestingly, Marjit, Rajeev and Mukherjee (2000) show that lack of complete information for the 
law-enforcing agent may help to partially prevent crime by making rewards and penalties more effective.  In a 
similar framework involving tax-payers Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2000) further shows that poorer sections 
lose more in corrupt systems than in honest systems.    
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 06). According to the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) estimates of 2004-05, only 
7% of the workforce in India belongs to the organized sector (Ratnam CSV: 2006, Economic 
Survey 2007- 2008). The diverse set of workers in the unorganized sector comprise of 
subsistence farmers, agricultural labor, daily wage earners, fishermen, servants/maids, dairy 
workers, artisans, vendors, retailers, weavers, traditional producers of handlooms, carpenters, 
garage mechanic, chauffeurs, producers using basic and primitive technologies, etc. and these 
individuals may either be entrepreneurs or workers in Directory and Non-Directory enterprises.  
Apart from these, a large number of contractual workers in private and semi-government formal 
sector units often do not receive compensations commensurate with labor laws in the country, 
including minimum wage.  Thus, the term “unorganized labor” is defined in the Indian context as 
those workers who have not been able to organize themselves in pursuit of their common 
interests due to certain constraints like casual nature of employment, ignorance and illiteracy, 
small and scattered size of establishments, etc.
5 The proportion of unorganized workers in India 
is much higher in the agrarian sector, building and construction industry and among home-based 
workers. However, despite overwhelming existence of the sector, statistical information on the 
intensity and accuracy of the same vary significantly. 
  Essentially therefore, we offer the missing disaggregated evidence on emergence of 
informal sector for a large country with wide regional variations. Rest of the paper is arranged as 
follows. Section 2 explains the data. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and 
benchmark results. Section 4 carries out some robustness analysis and Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                      
5 NCEUS (2007) provides more recent definition and classification of activities under the informal sector, which we 
follow closely.        
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 2.   Data 
  The data has been considered from various sources. The dependent variable, level of 
employment in the informal sector, is taken from the Ministry of Statistics and Program 
Implementation (MOSPI)’s National Data Warehouse of Official Statistics. The reports and 
publication in this database are based on Annual Survey of Industries, NSS and Economic 
Census as also secondary data available in the Warehouse. The data is taken from the publication 
titled “Informal Sector and Conditions of Employment in India”, 2004-05.
6 For our benchmark 
specifications, we consider proportion (per 1000) of informal sector (propriety and partnership) 
workers within each industry group across states. We consider total workers in both urban and 
rural sectors, workers only in the urban sector and workers only in the rural sector. We consider 
several industries ranging from Manufacturing, Construction, Real Estate, Education, etc.  
  The data for Corruption comes from Transparency International’s Corruption database. 
The data consists of corruption in the public sector. Eleven public sectors are considered that 
include Police (Crime/Traffic), Judiciary (Lower Courts), Land Administration, Municipal 
Services, Govt. Hospitals, Electricity (Consumers), PDS (Ration Card/ Supplies), Income Tax 
(individual assesses), Water Supply, Schools (up to 12th Std.) and Rural Financial Institutions 
(for farmers)
7.  We consider the composite score of corruption as well as individual scores in the 
respective sectors. Further, the TI Database on India is the most widely used state wise database 
on corruption and no other datasets encompass such an extensive sample as well as detailed 
                                                      
6 It is obtained from the seventh quinquennial survey on employment and unemployment conducted in the 61st 
round of NSS during July, 2004 to June, 2005. The survey was spread over 7,999 villages and 4,602 urban blocks 
covering 1,24,680 households (79,306 in the rural areas and 45,374 in the urban) and enumerating 6,02,833 persons 
(3,98,025 in the rural areas and 2,04,808 in the urban).   
7 Note that, agriculture in India is almost entirely in the informal sector.   
7 
 sector wise corruption data.   
The data on state domestic product (SDP) is taken from the Central Statistic Organization 
(CSO, GoI). SDP is considered at factor cost at constant prices of 1999 – 2000.  The other 
controls include population, literacy and Human Development Index (HDI). While Population 
and literacy are taken from Economic Survey 2008 – 2009, HDI data has been taken from 
National Human Development Report 2001.  
  Before testing the empirical associations, we offer some graphical representation of the 
raw data. To contextualize our hypothesis we look at growth rate of the unorganized 
manufacturing sector in different states in the past two decades. This exercise gives us a 
historical trend on the prevalence of unorganized sector across the country.
 8 Figure 1(A and B) 
shows growth of unorganized manufacturing sector for different states for two different census 
periods – economic census of 1980 and 1990. We consider the share of unorganized 
manufacturing enterprises for each state to total unorganized manufacturing enterprises in India. 
For rural India, while most of the states considered in the sample show a decline in unorganized 
manufacturing, Orissa, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh stand out as exceptions. Urban India, 
however, has more exceptions in this regard, namely Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Delhi, West 
Bengal, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Kerala.  
While Figure 1 describes share of unorganized manufacturing for 20 states under our 
consideration, Figure 2 focuses on four specific states – West Bengal, Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh and Kerala.  According to Besley and Burgess (2004), the first two are pro-worker and 
                                                      
8 We could not provide the same graphs for the present decade because of absence of comparable data. This is also 
the reason we could not use past years in our empirical analysis and undertake a panel estimation. However, the data 
for 1980 and 1990 still adds to our analysis and understanding of the trend in unorganized sector across Indian 
states. 
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 the latter two, pro-employer states as derived from the classification of amendments of the 
Industrial Disputes Act (1947) in India.  West Bengal passed largest number of pro-worker 
amendments since 1977 and has a declining formal manufacturing base.  Maharshtra and Gujarat 
on the other hand showed tremendous growth in organized manufacturing during the same 
period.  Thus, classification according to the Industrial Disputes Act does not explain high 
incidence of unorganized enterprises in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu (Figure 1) which are 
pro-employer and both of these have share of informal sector higher than West Bengal, which is 
infamous for extensive loss of man-days due to factory lock-outs and sustained labor-
management conflicts along with other political disturbances (see Appendix 4).  In other words, 
while Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, may be an important explanatory factor, there is still a 
strong case for seeking other explanations, such as corruption-informality linkage as we establish 
shortly. Appendix 1 provides the list of states used in the paper and Appendix 2 provides the 
summary statistics. 
  We like to provide a brief interpretation of the corruption database. The Transparency 
International (TI) Database captures the extent of corruption of a state or a country from the 
perspective of citizens – how much corruption is experienced by the common man and what do 
they perceive about the future.  Though the database does not capture the corruption existent 
among large businesses and small entrepreneurs, it is a representation of the corruption level of a 
state from the citizens’ point of view.  So, despite reservations against perception based 
indicators, it captures responses by households directly and indirectly affected by various types 
of corruption in the state. 
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 3.   Empirical Methodology and Benchmark Results 
A.   Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Specifications  
  We aim to investigate the impact of corruption on the size of the informal sector at the 
state level for a sample of 20 India states.  For our benchmark specifications, we consider 
ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications. Further, due to data constraints we consider cross 
sectional specifications.  Although data on informal activities over a span of about 25 years is 
available from the NSS at 5-year intervals, matching data on corruption is hard to come by.  
Therefore, we restrict this analysis to the cross-section of 2004-05 and intend to capture the long 
run implications once subsequent rounds of NSS are available in future.      
Thus, our empirical specification is as follows 
i i i i i i Inter SDP SDP Corruption Informal             5
2
4 3 2 1  (1) 
where   is the level of informal employment per 1000 workers ( for both propriety and 
partnership)  for state i for the  census period  2004 – 2005.    is the composite score 
of corruption for state i for the period 2004 – 2004.    denotes state domestic product for 
state i for the census year 2000-2001.    aims to capture the non-linear impact of state 
domestic product on the level of employment in the informal sector. Along with Corruption and 
SDP, our variable of interest is   as well.    is the interactive impact of corruption and 
SDP on the level of employment in the informal sector. A positive coefficient of   will 










 the informal sector. On the other hand, a negative coefficient of the same will suggest that given 
levels of SDP, a unit rise in corruption will lower the level of employment in the informal sector. 
Figure 3 presents scatter plots for total (urban + rural) informal employment, urban 
informal sector employment and rural informal sector employment. As can be seen from the 
figures, the slope of Figure 1(c) is least positive. Yet, overall it suggests that a higher level of 
corruption leads to a larger informal sector. 
   Table 1 presents the benchmark results. Column (1) represents employment in the 
informal sector per 1000 individuals for both the rural and urban sector. While column (2) 
represents employment in the informal sector per 1000 individuals for only the urban sector, 
column (3) represents the same for the rural sector. As can be seen from Table (1),    and 
 are significant for all three specifications. The sign of the coefficients of    and   





As SDP rises for a state, the level of informal employment goes up but the rate of increase occurs 
at a diminishing rate.  
  While the coefficient of corruption of corruption is positive for all three specifications, it 
is significant only for the first two specifications. Thus, it implies that as corruption rises, level 
of employment in the informal sector goes up.    is significant for the specification in 
Column (2) only but the coefficient is negative for all the specifications. As mentioned before, 
the negative coefficient suggests that for given levels of SDP, a unit rise in corruption, lowers the 
size of the informal sector. In order to fully understand the impact of corruption on the informal 
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
          (2) 
  Based on equation (2), it is possible to define a threshold level of SDP, SDP*,  the level 







 or a unit rise in corruption has no impact on the level of employment 
of the informal sector. Based on the figures of Column (2) specification in Table (1), SDP* = 
65814.  Thus, for all states whose   in 2000-01, the impact of corruption on 
informal employment is zero.  Further, though SDP has a concave relationship with size of the 
informal sector, the partial derivative of the dependent variable with respect to SDP will give us 







5 4 3 2   


        (3) 
Based on our results, while  3   is positive,   4   and  5   are negative. Taking the average levels of 
SDP and corruption for our sample and considering the coefficients from Table 1, 







. This implies that an unit rise in SDP leads to an increase in the size of the 







 be. It 
should, however, be noted here that reduction in the size of the informal sector is not contingent 
on a zero level of corruption because that, in most cases, is unachievable.  Novelty of the result 
lies in the fact that for a given level of corruption, a rising SDP holds the key to a shrinking 
12 
 informal sector in the economy.
9  
  In Table (2), we include the Human Development index (HDI).  HDI takes into account 
factors like life expectancy, educational attainment and income.  The results in Table (2) are 
quite similar to that in Table (1). 
B.   Addressing Endogeneity 
  While our benchmark results offer interesting directions, the OLS estimates might be 
biased and inconsistent due to the presence of endogeneity issues.  As our analysis shows, 
corruption is an important determinant of the size of the informal sector in each state.  But, it is 
also plausible that the presence of informal sector generates corruption in a state. The very 
presence of large informal sector implies unregistered and unaccounted activities, which might 
be the progenitor of various forms of interlinked corruption – driving the dependent and 
independent variables into a loop of causality. To overcome this problem we run Two Stage 
Least Square (2SLS) specifications. 
  The obvious challenge we face here is the task of finding efficient instruments. With no 
state-level study on corruption in India to fall back on, we turn to cross country evidence on 
corruption.  The extant literature on corruption has identified socio-demographic factors like 
schooling and population to be important determinants of corruption (see, Ali and Isse, 2003; 
Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Knack and Azfar, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 
1997).  So, we consider literacy levels and population data for the period 2000-01 across states 
as our instruments.   
                                                      
9 This is reiterated when we check the association between SDP and incidences of poverty (data taken from 
Transparency International). A higher SDP, as expected, is associated with steeply declining incidences of poverty 
implying greater economic opportunities for the population. 
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   Appendix 3 provides the first stage results.  The F statistic (= 6.95) is above conventional 
levels and it ensures that the used instruments are relevant.  Table 3 provides the results from 
2SLS specifications.  The estimates obtained are IV estimates and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  Our results remain robust.  We again find that the results are most significant 
for the urban sector, though the coefficients for the total informal figures are weakly significant. 
Sargan’s test for all the specifications shows that overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected 
at levels well above the conventional level. In terms of defining the threshold level of SDP, at 
which corruption has no impact on the size of the informal sector,   = 56900 for column (1) 
specification in Table (3). This threshold is approximately the same for the specifications in 
columns (2) and (3).  IV estimators under heteroskedasticity may not be efficient. So we re-run 
the specifications with 2 step feasible efficient GMM estimator. The results are presented in 
columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 and are similar. 
4.   Robustness 
  We carry our analysis further by breaking down the composite corruption score for 
different sectors. Based on Transparency International (TI) ranking, these sectors can be need-
based or basic.  As mentioned in the data section, the need-based sectors considered are rural 
financial services (RFI), Income Tax, Municipal Services, Judiciary, Land Administration and 
police. The basic sectors consist of Schooling (up to 12
th grade), Water Supply, PDS (Ration 
Card/ Supplies), Electricity (Consumers) and Government Hospital.  Tables (5), (6) and (7) 
present results with sector-wise corruption for employment in informal sector in both urban and 
rural sector, only urban sector, and only rural sector respectively.  
14 
   Table (4) shows that corruption in certain sectors is more sensitive to the size of the 
informal sector relative to others.  Corruption in sectors like Municipal services, PDS/ Ration 
and Government Hospitals, lead to a larger informal sector.  At the same time, higher SDP 
mitigates the adverse impact of corruption in the same sectors. The results in Table (6) are 
similar. We check the robustness of the findings in Table (4) by running IV and GMM 
specifications.  For the IV specification, our results are similar, though statistical significance is 
not retained in certain cases.  For the total sample, we get statistical significance for water 
supply, PDS/ration and municipal service.  For the urban sub-sample, statistical significance is 
retained in case of Judiciary as well.  The rural sub-sample retains statistical significance only in 
case of Water Supply. The retention of statistical significance for the above services is intuitive 
because municipal services, public distribution system and water supply are prone to corruption 
and can be traded in the illegal market. The relationship is unambiguously stronger in case of 
urban samples, where the alternatives to each of these facilities are many and that the respective 
departments are readily amenable to agent level corruption.  Clearly, these are also the services 
that demand maximum government resources particularly in the rural areas where operations by 
private firms are at extremely low.  Hence, a state with bad governance would have a greater 
tendency of such services being affected by corruption and by virtue of their importance market 
imperfections yield large informal arrangements.  
The results in the previous section consider overall employment in the informal sector. 
We, further check our results by breaking down total employment in the informal sector by 
industry classifications for urban and rural areas together as well as urban and rural sectors 
separately.  The results are presented in Table 4.  The industries considered are Manufacturing, 
15 
 Construction and Education.  As can be seen from the table, the results are strongly significant 
for Manufacturing Industry, except for rural sector.   
 
5.   Conclusion 
  Our study offers an interesting empirical analysis to the growing literature on informal 
sector by adopting a political economy framework. The analysis is novel because to our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical investigation on the corruption-informality linkage on India.  
More importantly, the results show that a higher level of corruption leads to a larger informal 
sector and account for a high level of employment.  Interestingly, as state-level productivity rises 
the positive impact of corruption on the size of the informal sector reverses itself.  In fact, for 
higher levels of state domestic product prevalence of high corruption shrinks the informal sector 
under all specifications considered.  The study is also an attempt at generalizing isolated cases on 
such linkages.  It also verifies and turns around previously unaccounted for explanations on state 
characteristics (such as implementation of labor laws and industrial laws) and the existence of 
informal sector in India.  Here, rise in corruption unambiguously raises the size of the informal 
sector when we identify states with SDP lower than a critical level.  Determination of the critical 
SDP below which corruption and level of informal activity reinforce each other is an important 
step towards policy targeting.  To the extent that high SDP shrinks informal activities the 
message is clear.  However, in recent times, states such as West Bengal reported that 42% of its 
SDP is generated in the unorganized sector (Human Development Report, 2004).  Thus, unless 
the formal sector’s share in SDP is sufficiently high, the relationship between corruption and 
informal sector at a critical SDP may suffer from circularity of arguments. In future attempts we 
intend to disentangle the sources of income, investigate relations between corruption and per 
16 
 capita income, poverty and inequality, ease of doing business (India ranks 132
nd globally, and 
major cities where large informal sector spawns include poor ranks for Mumbai at 10, Kolkata at 
17, World Bank-IFC, 2009) etc. with consequent implications for growing informality at the 
state level.  Finally, the empirical results from India motivates us to construct appropriate theory 
in near future where one could generate combinations of tax and bribe to observe emergence and 
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Manufacturing Enterprises in four states of India in 1980 and 1990 
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 Figure 3: Association between Corruption and Informal Sector, 2004-2005 
 























 Table 1: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variables  Rural + Urban  Urban  Rural 
      
Corruption 0.283*  0.562***  0.207 
 (0.153)  (0.179)  (0.174) 
SDP 0.00605***  0.00836***  0.00598*** 
 (0.00154)  (0.00218)  (0.00169) 
SDP sq  -1.67e-08***  -1.79e-08***  -1.89e-08*** 
 (2.75e-09)  (3.56e-09)  (2.88e-09) 
SDP*Corruption -4.30e-06  -8.27e-06**  -3.10e-06 
 (2.77e-06)  (3.58e-06)  (2.94e-06) 
Constant 444.7***  233.0**  499.8*** 
 (82.09)  (98.85)  (99.03) 
      
Observations 20  20  20 
R-squared 0.564  0.678  0.630 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













 Table 2: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector – Inclusion of HDI 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Independent Variables  Rural + Urban  Urban  Rural 
      
Corruption 0.240  0.562**  0.197 
 (0.157)  (0.190)  (0.178) 
SDP 0.00667***  0.00837***  0.00612*** 
 (0.00162)  (0.00220)  (0.00167) 
SDP sq  -1.76e-08***  -1.79e-08***  -1.91e-08*** 
 (2.88e-09)  (3.61e-09)  (2.92e-09) 
SDP*Corruption -5.22e-06*  -8.28e-06**  -3.31e-06 
 (2.91e-06)  (3.61e-06)  (2.96e-06) 
HDI -195.1  -2.427  -43.87 
 (178.0)  (172.4)  (131.0) 
Constant 540.7***  234.2  521.4*** 
 (116.0)  (138.2)  (124.4) 
      
Observations 20  20  20 
R-squared 0.594  0.678  0.631 













Table 3: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector - 2SLS specifications 
 IV  GMM 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent   Rural + Urban  Urban  Rural  Rural + Urban  Urban  Rural 
         
Corruption  0.523 0.569*  0.598  0.433 0.575* 0.478 
  (0.350) (0.300)  (0.407) (0.341) (0.300) (0.378) 
SDP 0.00879***  0.00843***  0.00914***  -8.39e-06 -8.75e-06** -7.47e-06 
 (0.00302)  (0.00246)  (0.00333)  (5.74e-06) (4.46e-06) (6.21e-06) 
SDP  sq  -1.87e-08***  -1.80e-08*** -2.07e-08***  0.00830*** 0.00853*** 0.00825*** 
 (2.73e-09)  (3.00e-09)  (2.81e-09) (0.00299) (0.00246) (0.00313) 
SDP*Corruption  --0.00001  -0.00001*  --0.00001  -1.89e-08*** -1.80e-08*** -2.06e-08*** 
 (0.00001)  (0.000004)  (0.00001)  (2.73e-09) (3.00e-09) (2.81e-09) 
HDI  -164.7 -1.635  -0.713 -218.5 -46.22 -40.81 
 (182.3)  (150.1)  (159.6)  (176.2) (147.0) (151.4) 
Constant  387.7*  230.2  304.2 460.1** 250.8  388.5 
 (228.2)  (186.9)  (263.7)  (219.4) (186.3) (241.3) 
         
Observations 20 20  20 20 20 20 
R-squared  0.564 0.678  0.575 0.574 0.674 0.598 
Sargan Statistic   1.16  
(p = 0.28) 
2.29 
(p = 0.13) 
0.49 
( p = 0.48) 
--- --- --- 
 
Hansen J Statistic  ---  ---  ---  1.33 
(p = 0.25) 
2.17 
(p = 0.14) 
0.63 
( p = 0.43) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







 Table 4: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector – Considering Sector Wise Corruption (Urban + Rural) 








Police School Water 
Supply 
PDS/Ration Electricity Government 
Hospitals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
               
SDP  0.00404***  0.00420**  0.00521*** 0.00573***  0.00456  0.00258  0.00417*** 0.00489*** 0.00596*** 0.00387*** 0.00573*** 
  (0.00107) (0.00149)  (0.000675)  (0.00165) (0.00275) (0.00419)  (0.000933)  (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00102) (0.00119) 




















  (3.26e-09) (3.92e-09) (2.81e-09) (3.27e-09)  (5.39e-09)  (4.00e-09) (3.09e-09) (3.33e-09) (2.84e-09) (2.83e-09) (3.13e-09) 
Corruption   1.063  0.790 2.633*** 2.101  1.771  -0.181  2.733  1.214  2.145**  1.393  4.196** 
  (2.889) (1.920) (0.852) (1.504)  (2.296)  (4.143) (2.658) (1.641) (0.866) (1.617) (1.564) 
Interaction  -1.32e-05 -8.43e-06  -3.12e-
05*** 
-2.73e-05 -1.11e-05 1.77e-05  -1.92e-05  -2.35e-05 -4.53e-05* -1.74e-06  -5.40e-05** 
  (3.55e-05) (2.11e-05) (9.55e-06) (1.98e-05)  (2.97e-05)  (5.78e-05) (3.56e-05) (1.48e-05) (2.21e-05) (1.98e-05) (2.34e-05) 
Constant  560.7*** 553.3*** 456.4*** 444.3***  471.0**  596.9*  525.1*** 535.1*** 495.4*** 530.5*** 438.2*** 
  (88.37) (94.53) (53.19) (120.4)  (171.2)  (295.4) (69.27) (76.82) (50.51) (72.68) (48.41) 
               
Observations  20 20 20 20  20  20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared  0.537 0.538 0.594 0.556  0.556  0.538 0.566 0.569 0.576 0.563 0.588 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 













 Table 5: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector – Considering Sector Wise Corruption (Urban) 
  Rural 
Financial 
Services 




Police School Water 
Supply 
PDS/Ration Electricity Government 
Hospitals 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
               
SDP  0.00428**  0.00534**  0.00604***  0.00654**  0.00739*  0.00547  0.00498*** 0.00606*** 0.00781*** 0.00507*** 0.00721*** 
  (0.00147) (0.00204) (0.00114) (0.00294)  (0.00381)  (0.00556) (0.00144) (0.00139) (0.00151) (0.00138) (0.00183) 






  (4.64e-09) (5.05e-09) (3.19e-09) (4.93e-09)  (7.26e-09)  (5.54e-09) (3.78e-09) (4.01e-09) (3.77e-09) (3.27e-09) (4.17e-09) 
Corruption    1.847  2.699  3.910***  2.633 4.193 3.247  5.246  2.778  4.569***  3.537*  6.390*** 
  (3.709) (2.429) (1.294) (2.785)  (3.100)  (4.926) (3.776) (2.308) (0.873) (1.880) (1.962) 
Interaction -1.28e-05  -2.78e-05  -4.43e-05*** -3.54e-05  -4.42e-05  -1.76e-05 -4.93e-05  -4.37e-05*  -7.93e-05**  -2.50e-05  -8.66e-05** 
  (4.69e-05) (2.81e-05) (1.31e-05) (3.50e-05)  (4.23e-05)  (7.45e-05) (5.08e-05) (2.06e-05) (2.83e-05) (2.51e-05) (3.27e-05) 
Constant  465.1*** 402.6*** 321.0***  336.6  232.0  281.6  398.8*** 401.3*** 322.9*** 372.7*** 287.0*** 
  (115.2) (124.9) (85.38) (211.1)  (229.5)  (352.5) (99.59) (97.72) (52.69) (85.21) (80.28) 
               
Observations  20 20 20 20  20  20 20 20 20 20 20 
R-squared  0.597 0.616 0.687 0.604  0.637  0.612 0.643 0.666 0.721 0.665 0.680 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










Table 6: Impact of Corruption on Informal Sector – Considering Sector Wise Corruption (Rural) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
V A R I A   B L E S             
              
SDP  0.00487*** 0.00439** 0.00524***  0.00554***  0.00495*  0.00359  0.00465***  0.00507***  0.00541*** 0.00452*** 0.00643*** 
  (0.000930) (0.00154) (0.000789) (0.00169)  (0.00260)  (0.00413) (0.000904) (0.00128)  (0.00110)  (0.00115)  (0.00102) 
SDP  sq  -1.67e-08*** -1.81e-08*** -1.72e-08*** -1.89e-08*** -1.83e-08*** -1.75e-08*** -1.77e-08*** -1.89e-08*** -1.97e-08*** -1.80e-08*** -1.84e-08*** 
  (3.13e-09) (4.00e-09) (2.92e-09) (3.46e-09) (5.10e-09) (4.08e-09) (3.11e-09) (3.58e-09) (3.06e-09) (3.01e-09)  (2.75e-09) 
Corruption  2.280 0.0286  1.961**  1.507 1.346 -0.603 2.184 0.533 1.576  0.814  3.470* 
  (2.177) (1.961) (0.874) (1.413) (2.126) (4.341) (2.351) (1.852) (0.948) (1.822)  (1.796) 
Interaction  -2.92e-05  -5.27e-07 -1.96e-05* -1.62e-05  -8.56e-06  1.07e-05 -1.51e-05 -1.50e-05 -2.22e-05 -3.87e-06 -5.39e-05** 
  (2.99e-05) (2.06e-05) (1.02e-05) (1.94e-05) (2.63e-05) (5.59e-05) (3.20e-05) (1.72e-05) (1.82e-05) (2.13e-05)  (2.34e-05) 
Constant  549.1*** 601.8*** 505.7*** 500.4*** 515.5***  645.3*  554.3*** 578.8*** 537.9*** 570.6***  477.1*** 
  (74.97) (101.0) (59.90) (117.8) (169.1) (312.8) (65.36) (89.73) (59.94) (86.02)  (55.25) 
              
Observations  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  20 
R-squared  0.630 0.615 0.647 0.626 0.626 0.615 0.634 0.632 0.634 0.621  0.650 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 












Table 7: Impact of Corruption on Informal Employment for Different Industries in Urban and Rural Areas 
 Manufacturing  Construction  Education 
Independent Variables  Total  Urban  Rural Total  Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                  
SDP  0.00830**  0.0191***  0.00405  0.0114*** 0.0123** 0.00996**  0.00771 0.00622  0.00945 
 (0.00327)  (0.00421)  (0.00627)  (0.00346)  (0.00546) (0.00362)  (0.00567)  (0.00600)  (0.00584) 
SDP sq  -1.42e-08**  -2.87e-08***  -1.37e-08  -2.56e-08***  -2.31e-08*** -2.99e-08*** -1.98e-08*  -1.48e-08  -2.39e-08** 
 (5.78e-09)  (7.56e-09)  (8.69e-09)  (5.27e-09) (7.63e-09) (5.63e-09)  (9.66e-09) (9.94e-09)  (1.02e-08) 
Corruption 0.872**  2.243***  -0.930  0.327  0.379  0.470  0.129  -0.0152  0.110 
 (0.303)  (0.452)  (0.916)  (0.401)  (0.675)  (0.504)  (0.296)  (0.454)  (0.285) 
SDP*Corruption -1.09e-05*  -2.56e-05***  -2.07e-06  -1.04e-05* -1.27e-05  -6.76e-06  -6.57e-06 -5.76e-06  -8.59e-06 
 (5.40e-06)  (7.29e-06)  (1.19e-05)  (5.44e-06) (9.69e-06) (5.47e-06)  (9.10e-06) (9.86e-06)  (8.98e-06) 
Literacy -0.515  4.138  -16.20  -1.431  -3.328  3.041  -3.408  -4.742  -5.227 
 (2.379)  (3.659)  (11.16)  (2.000)  (2.823)  (3.894)  (3.517)  (3.248)  (2.980) 
Constant 303.0  -890.5*  2,231*  437.7  594.1  78.30  252.8  527.9  334.8 
 (278.3)  (437.5)  (1,093)  (314.7)  (446.4) (482.0)  (313.2)  (330.2)  (266.5) 
                  
Observations 20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R-squared 0.379  0.667  0.357  0.759  0.658  0.625  0.262  0.190  0.329 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Appendix 1: List of States 
Bihar Haryana  Tamil  Nadu 
Chhattisgarh  Jammu and Kashmir   Delhi 
Maharashtra  Madhya Pradesh  Uttar Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh  Karnataka  Orissa 
Gujarat Rajasthan  West  Bengal 
Himachal Pradesh  Assam  Punjab 




Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 




















Corruption (Composite)  20  488.95  104.77  695  240 
SDP ( 2000 - 01)  20  74980.35     52296.86    210526  13262    
Literacy  20  66.45        10.21       90.86  47   
Population   20    50195.2      38004.61       166198  6078   










 Appendix 3: First Stage Results 
 Estimates 
  















F test for excluded 
Instruments 
6.95 
Partial R-sq of excluded 
Instruments 
0.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 










 Appendix 4: State-wise Mandays Lost, Resulting in Work Stoppages Due to Industrial 









States/UTs 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Andhra Pradesh 4385 1497 1718 7129 957 1012 2405 342 637
Arunachal Pradesh - - - - - - - - -
Assam 50 13 20 9 68 112 100 29 288
Bihar 2078 310 61 60 146 23 124 60 95
Chhattisgarh - - - 13 29 10 27 4 27
Goa 59 97 17 2 - - - - -
Gujarat 618 225 102 147 163 187 201 97 43
Haryana 206 NA 571 136 158 494 418 48 5
Himachal Pradesh 287 69 20 33 25 23 15 9 11
Jammu & Kashmir - - - - - @ 9 @ -
J h a r k h a n d ------ 5 6 -
Karnataka 504 1005 322 140 217 458 286 94 213
Kerala 1498 945 6961 568 469 3619 463 227 613
Madhya Pradesh 621 172 5 113 55 85 119 12 59
Maharashtra 1755 742 633 547 1347 1433 449 1 31
Manipur 8 80 6 10 52 19 - - -
Meghalaya - 7 - - - - - - -
M i z o r a m ------ - -
N a g a l a n d ------ - -
Orissa 197 33 5 237 72 122 159 10 -
Punjab 151 228 220 314 310 33 110 49 90
Rajasthan 741 1259 1308 1308 1332 1927 1335 953 974
S i k k i m ------ - -
Tamil Nadu 2588 1842 1563 939 638 661 720 1411 806
T r i p u r a -5 - - - ----
Uttar Pradesh 1896 367 110 98 185 133 46 42 1410
Uttaranchal - 9 10 21 33 39 503 25 12
West Bengal 10570 14847 12911 18412 17565 19216 12521 23738 11998
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 41 2 - - - - - - -
Chandigarh 348 9 21 19 12 47 105 6 -
Dadra & Nagar Haveli - - - - - - - - -
D a m a n  &  D i u ------ - -
Delhi 160 4 - 2 32 10 154 11 110
L a k s h a d w e e p ------ - -
Pondicherry - - - - - - - - -
India 28763 23767 26586 30256 23866 29665 20324 27167 17433
Note : - : Nil.
     @  NA : Not Available.
(' 000)
Source: Ministry of Labour and Employment, Govt. of India. 